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Abstract
The globalization of financial markets, information technology development, 
and increasing competition have largely affected bank business and its risk manage-
ment. Together with these forces, regulatory factors play a significant role. This 
chapter approaches bank risk management under the regulators’ perspective with 
an emphasis on the risk-based capital regulation. Specifically, how bank risk is 
regulated under the risk-based capital regulation and whether the regulation shapes 
bank risk are discussed in detail. In such a way, the chapter provides better under-
standing of the risk-based capital regulation and bank risk-taking behaviors.
Keywords: Basel Accords, capital regulation, bank risk, risk management, credit risk
1. Introduction
Risk management is important for a bank to ensure its profitability and sound-
ness. It is also a concern of regulators to maintain the safety and soundness of the 
financial system. Over the past decades, banking business has developed with the 
introduction of advanced trading technologies and sophisticated financial products. 
While these advancements enhance bank’s intermediation role, promote profit-
ability, and better diversify bank risk, they raise significant challenges to bank 
risk management. The risk management of banks has been considered to be weak 
compared to the rapid changes in the financial markets [1]. In the light of the recent 
global financial crisis, bank risk management has become the major concern of 
banking regulators and policy makers.
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (hereafter, the Basel Committee), 
which was established in 1974 by the central bank governors of G-10 countries1, 
acts as the primary global standard setter for banking prudential regulation. The 
Committee sets international standards and guidelines for national regulators to 
assess and supervise their banking system. Its landmark publication—the Basel 
Accord—largely affects the way banks manage their capital and risk as well as the 
way they are monitored and supervised by the regulators.
This chapter approaches bank risk management under the regulators’ perspec-
tive with an emphasis on the risk-based capital regulation. Section 2 provides a 
brief overview about bank risk and risk management. Since the regulation practice 
in most countries is pretty much based on the guidelines of the Basel Committee, 
this section primarily follows the Committee’s documents. Section 3 introduces 
1  The Group of Ten (G-10) is made up of 11 industrial countries, including Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA.
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the Basel Accords (i.e., Basel I, II, and III), which set the international standards 
for bank capital regulation, and clearly states how and what types of bank risk 
are covered by the Accords. Although the Accords, and the capital regulation in 
general, are expected to discipline the risk-taking behavior of banks, such effect is 
still under debate. Sections 4 and 5, respectively, present theoretical arguments and 
global evidences about whether the capital regulation reduces bank risk-taking. For 
the purpose of the chapter, only risk-based capital regulation is concerned. Section 
6 provides a summary of the chapter.
2. Overview of risk and risk management in banking
Bank risk is usually referred as the potential loss to a bank due to the occurrence 
of particular events. Key risks in banking include credit risk, interest rate risk, 
market risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk.
Credit risk is “the potential of a bank borrower or counterparty that will fail 
to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms” [2]. Exposure to credit 
risk is the largest and major source of problems in most banks. Credit risk does 
not only derive from loans but also from other activities on both banking book 
and trading book, as well as on- and off-balance sheets. Therefore, credit risk also 
comprises counterparty risk (the risk that a party in a financial transaction will 
default).
Interest rate risk (in the banking book) is related to the adverse movements 
in interest rates of bank assets, liabilities, and/or off-balance sheet items. A change 
in the interest rate affects a bank’s expected interest incomes and expenses and 
thus affects its future marginal profits. The Basel Committee [3] identifies three 
main types of interest rate risk including gap risk, basic risk, and option risk. Gap 
risk arises from the term structure of the interest rates. Basic risk is related to the 
relative changes in interest rates for financial instruments with similar tenors but 
priced using different interest rate indices. Option risk, on the other hand, arises 
from option derivatives or from options embedded in a bank’s assets, liabilities, 
and/or off-balance sheet items. This third type is indirect interest rate risk because it 
depends on the decisions of the bank and/or its customers.
Market risk is “the risk of losses in on and off-balance-sheet positions arising 
from movements in market prices” [4]. This definition covers both interest rate 
risk related to instruments and equity marked to market, foreign exchange risk of 
positions in foreign currencies, and the price risk of commodities that can be traded 
on a secondary market.
Liquidity risk refers to the bank’s inability to fund the increase in assets and 
meet obligations at a reasonable cost. Two types of liquidity risk include funding 
liquidity risk and market liquidity risk. Funding liquidity risk is the risk that the 
bank cannot meet efficiently current and future cash flow and collateral needs 
without affecting its daily operations or the financial condition. Market liquidity 
risk is the risk that the bank is unable to easily offset or eliminate a position at the 
market price due to inadequate market depth or market disruption [5]. Liquidity 
risk is inherent in banking since there is usually a maturity mismatch related to 
bank’s transformation of short-term liabilities into longer-term assets.
Operational risk is “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events” [6]. Operational risk can 
arise from any banking products, activities, processes, and systems.
Risk management is important for banks to ensure their profitability and 
soundness. It is the process established by bank managers to ensure that all risks 
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associated with the bank’s activities are identified, measured, limited, controlled, 
mitigated, and reported on a timely and comprehensive basis [7]. A sound risk 
management system is necessary to support the regulators in assessing bank’s 
soundness and to reinforce the market participants’ confidence in the banking 
system. The Basel Committee [1] suggests that a sound risk management system 
should have: (i) active board and senior management oversight; (ii) appropriate 
policies, procedures, and limits; (iii) comprehensive and timely identification, 
measurement, mitigation, controlling, monitoring, and reporting of risks; (iv) 
appropriate management information systems at the business and firm-wide level; 
and (iv) comprehensive internal controls.
The Basel Committee sets out a number of standards and guidelines for bank 
risk management. Table 1 summarizes main documents related to regulation of 
bank risk management by the Basel Committee.
3. Regulation of bank risk under the Basel Accords
Bank risk management and capital management are inseparately related to 
each other. As specified under Principle 15 in Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision by the Basel Committee [8], the bank’s risk management process 
should be able to assess the adequacy of their capital in relation to their risk profile 
as well as market and macroeconomic conditions. In a similar way, Principle 16 
Types Documents First issued Last 
revised
Standards Core principles for effective banking supervision Sep 1997 Sep 2012
Guidelines Corporate governance principles for banks Sep 1999 Jul 2015
Guidelines Principles for sound stress testing practices and 
supervision
May 2009 None
Standards Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more 
resilient banks and banking systems
Dec 2010 Jun 2011
Standards Basel III: The liquidity coverage ratio and liquidity risk 
monitoring tools
Dec 2010 Jan 2013
Standards Basel III: The net stable funding ratio Dec 2010 Oct 2014
Standards Basel III: Finalizing post-crisis reforms Dec 2017 None
Standards Basel II: International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised 
Framework—Comprehensive Version
Jun 2004 Jun 2006
Guidelines Principles for the Management of Credit Risk Sep 2000 None
Guidelines Best Practices for Credit Risk Disclosure Sep 2000 None
Guidelines Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision
Feb 2000 Sep 2008
Guidelines Principles for the Sound Management of Operational 
Risk
Feb 2003 Jun 2011
Standards Interest rate risk in the banking book Sep 1997 Apr 2016
Source: Authors’ compilation from Basel Committee’s publications (available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publications.
htm?m=5%7C28%7C427).
Table 1. 
Basel Committee documents on bank risk management.
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requires that the capital adequacy requirements should reflect all risks taken and 
presented by a bank given the markets and macroeconomic conditions that it oper-
ates. In such manner, the Basel Accords specify capital requirements to adequately 
cover bank risks. The following provides details of how and what types of risks are 
regulated under Basel Accords.
3.1 Basel I
The risk-based capital adequacy standards were introduced by the Basel 
Committee in 1988 and commonly known as Basel I Accord. The Accord not only 
sets standards for capital adequacy but also affects the bank’s risk management. 
Initially, only credit risk is addressed since it is the major risk of banks. Under 
Basel I, banks are required to hold an adequate amount of capital to cover their 
credit risks related to different categories of on- and off-balance sheet assets. For 
on-balance sheet assets, the Accord assigns a risk weight ranging from 0, 10, 20, 
and 50 to 100% on different asset categories. For off-balance sheet exposures, 
credit conversion factors are applied to different types of off-balance-sheet 
instruments or transactions based on their estimated size, the likely occurrence 
of the credit exposure, and the relative degree of credit risk. These credit conver-
sion factors are then multiplied by the weights applicable to the category of the 
counterparty for an on-balance-sheet transaction to determine the amount of 
risk-weighted assets [9].
Efforts to address other risks other than credit risk have been made continu-
ously. As a result, Basel I was refined in January 1996 to comprise requirements for 
market risk which arose from exposures to foreign exchange, traded debt securities, 
equities, commodities, and options. In measuring market risk, banks are allowed 
to choose between standardized approach and internal models approach, subject 
to the approval of the national authorities. By incorporating market risks into the 
risk framework, Basel Committee clarifies that credit risk requirements exclude 
debt and equity securities in the trading book and all positions in commodities but 
include the credit counterparty risk on all over-the-counter derivatives whether in 
the trading or the banking books [10].
3.2 Basel II
The framework was revised in June 2004, commonly referred as Basel II, with 
the introduction of operational risk in addition to the existing credit risk and 
market risk. Under the Basel framework, operational risk includes legal risk but 
excludes strategic and reputational risk. Basel II provides three available methods 
to calculate capital charges for operational risk, including basic indicator approach, 
standardized approach, and advanced measurement approach. The use of stan-
dardized approach and advanced measurement approach is subject to supervisory 
approval [11].
The revised framework also provides more flexibility in calculating capital 
requirements for credit risk. Accordingly, banks are allowed to choose between 
standardized approach and internal rating-based approach, depending on which 
approach is more appropriate for their operations and financial market infra-
structure. The credit risk measurement is also more risk sensitive than in Basel 
I. Specifically, standardized approach is supported by external credit assessments, 
and the risk weights have a wider range from 0 up to 350% (for the case of securi-
tization tranches that are rated between BB+ and BB−). There is also consideration 
for past due loans more than 90 days, treatments of credit risk mitigation, and 
securitization exposures [11].
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Despite attempting to capture most risks in the minimum capital requirements, 
Basel Committee acknowledges that it is impossible to cover all risks. For such 
reason, they introduce Pillar 2 for Supervisory Review and Pillar 3 for Market 
Discipline to complement the minimum capital requirement, which is regarded as 
Pillar 1.
The Pillar 2 aims to treat risks that are not fully included or considered in Pillar 
1 such as credit concentration risk, interest rate risk in the banking book, business 
and strategic risk, and factors external to the bank such as business cycle effects. 
In addition to ensure that banks have adequate capital to support their risks, 
Pillar 2 encourages banks to develop and use better risk management techniques. 
Therefore, banks are required to have an overall capital adequacy assessment 
process according to their risk profile and a capital maintaining strategy. This 
involves the board and senior management oversight, a sound capital assessment, 
a comprehensive assessment of risks, monitoring and reporting, and an internal 
control review. Bank’s self-assessment will be then reviewed and evaluated by 
supervisors [11].
The Pillar 3 complements the other two pillars by requiring banks to disclose 
information about their scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assess-
ment processes, and the capital adequacy. The disclosure is expected to inform the 
market about the bank’s risk exposures and provide a consistent and understand-
able framework that enhances the comparability among banks [11].
The 2004 Basel framework focuses primarily on the banking book. More 
attention to trading book as well as exposures to the double default is expressed in a 
consensus document released in July 2005 [12]. Accordingly, the Basel Committee 
provides detailed treatment of counterparty credit risk and cross-product net-
ting, treatment of double-default effects, short-term maturity adjustments in the 
internal rating-based approach, improvements to the current trading book regime, 
and specific capital treatment for failed transactions and transactions that are not 
settled through a delivery-versus-payment framework. These changes ensure the 
risk sensitivity of capital requirement for credit risk and market risk in Pillar I, as 
well as enhance the requirements for bank’s internal capital adequacy assessment 
and market disclosure, particularly for the counterparty credit risk, concentration 
credit risk, and trading book. The document was then incorporated into the existing 
framework in June 2006 [4].
3.3 Basel III
The massive failure of the banking system during the global financial crisis 
2007–2009 forced the revision of Basel II. Consequently, Basel III was issued in 
mid-December 2010 and consequently revised in June 2011. The new framework 
enhances the risk coverage in three Pillars, particularly credit risk and market 
risk by raising capital requirements for the trading book and complex securitiza-
tion exposures, introducing a stressed value-at-risk (VaR) capital requirement 
based on a continuous 12-month period of significant financial stress, requiring 
higher capital charges for so-called resecuritizations in both the banking and 
the trading books and strengthening the capital requirements for counterparty 
credit exposures arising from banks’ derivatives, repo, and securities financing 
activities [13].
Basel III also introduces liquidity requirements to address bank’s liquidity 
risk, which was considered as not properly managed during the early phase of the 
financial crisis in 2007. Two minimum standards for funding, namely, liquidity 
coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), are proposed. These 
two standards are designed to promote both short-term and long-term resilience 
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of a bank’s liquidity risk profile. Specifically, the LCR ensures that the bank has 
sufficient high-quality liquid resources to survive an acute stress scenario last-
ing for 1 month. And the NSFR creates additional incentives for a bank to fund 
its activities with more stable sources of funding on an ongoing structural basis 
(1 year). In supporting supervisors to monitor banks’ liquidity risk profiles, Basel 
Committee develops a set of common metrics to be considered as the minimum 
types of information for supervisors. These include contractual maturity mismatch, 
concentration of funding, available unencumbered assets, LCR by currency, and 
market-related monitoring tools [13]. The regulation on liquidity risk was revised in 
January 2013 for the liquidity coverage ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools and 
in October 2014 for the net stable funding ratio [14, 15].
In December 2017, the Basel Committee completed its Basel III post-crisis 
reforms. Accordingly, the revised framework enhances the robustness and risk 
sensitivity of the standardized approaches for credit risk and reduces the reliance 
of its external credit ratings. The use of internally modeled approaches is more 
constrained. For operational risk, the framework replaces the advanced measure-
ment approaches and the existing three standardized approaches with a single risk-
sensitive standardized approach. The new standardized approach is determined 
based on bank’s income and bank’s historical losses [16].
4. The effect of risk-based capital requirements on bank risk behavior
The risk-based capital requirements aim at creating a discipline for bank risk 
behavior, through which they help ensure the global financial stability. However, 
there are controversies whether they shape bank risk. Since the introduction of 
Basel Accord in 1988, continuing efforts have been concentrated on showing how 
these risk-based capital requirements affect bank risk. Studies fall into four theo-
ries, which focus on different factors to explain bank risk behavior. These factors 
include moral hazard, franchise value, capital buffer, and agency problem.
4.1 Moral hazard theory
Given the limited capital and the existence of information asymmetry, banks 
are induced to take excessive risk. This is often regarded as the moral hazard 
problem, whereby one party to a transaction engages in activities detrimental to 
the other party [17]. The problem is exacerbated with the existence of the deposit 
insurance. In order to improve the depositors’ confidence in the banking system 
and stabilize the financial system, the government usually provides banks with the 
deposit insurance (either implicitly or explicitly). Under the protection of deposit 
insurance, the depositors incur no risk of depositing into the bank. Thus, they 
lose incentives to monitor bank operations. Consequently, banks have incentives 
to take greater risks. Therefore, researchers examining the effect of risk-based 
capital requirements on bank risk-taking in a context of the moral hazard focus on 
the limited liability of banks and the existence of the deposit insurance. However, 
using different models and assumptions, these studies arrive at different conclu-
sions. Negative effect of capital requirements on bank risk-taking is suggested 
by Kim and Santomero, Flannery, Furlong and Keeley, Gjerde and Semmen, and 
Zweifel, Pfaff, and Kühn [18–22]. However, Gennotte and Pyle and Rochet suggest 
a positive effect [23, 24]. Mixed result is proposed by Calem and Rob, Blum, and 
Silva [25–27].
Kim and Santomero [18] adopt a single-period mean-variance model, which 
assumes that banks are single-period risk-averse expected utility maximizers. 
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The bank’s objective function is to maximize the utility, which depends on the 
mean and standard deviation of return on equity. The capital requirements will 
set a bound on the bank’s expected return on equity and alter its choices of risk 
and return. Consequently, bank hesitates to extend credit to assets with high-risk 
weights and shuffles the asset portfolio toward more safe assets and less risky assets.
Flannery [19] explains the effect of risk-based capital requirements on bank 
risks by unifying the above utility function with an option price function. The 
option price function regards deposit insurance as a put option, which the bank can 
maximize by selecting the riskiest available asset portfolio. The model assumes that 
bank asset decision is two periods and bank chooses a loan portfolio that maximizes 
its expected return on equity. This return is affected by the value of the deposit 
insurance option, which depends on the permissible leverage. The capital require-
ments penalize higher risk with more capital, which imply a negative relationship 
between risk and leverage. In such way, the capital requirements lower banks’ 
preferred loan risk while they pursue high portfolio risk to maximize the deposit 
insurance’s put option value.2
Furlong and Keeley [20] employ both state-preference model and option model. 
In the state-preference model, the authors consider an insured bank that aims to 
maximize its current value of equity through two possible future states. With a 
given initial capital, the bank that seeks to maximize the current value of its equity 
will try to maximize the value of the deposit insurance option. This is equivalent 
to the option model, in which the bank’s objective is to maximize the value of the 
deposit insurance. This can be done by maintaining the highest degree of leverage 
(i.e., the lower capital ratio) allowed by the regulation and increasing asset portfolio 
risk. The gain from increasing asset risk depends on the asset size rather than the 
leverage. However, the change in leverage directly affects the asset size. Therefore, 
the marginal gain from increasing asset risk is positively correlated to the leverage 
change. This means that lower leverage caused by the capital requirements will 
reduce the bank’s marginal gain from increase in asset risk and, thus, reduce bank’s 
incentive to increase asset risk. In addition, for a given level of leverage, the insur-
ance subsidy’s value is positively correlated with asset volumes. This suggests that 
bank prefers to increase capital rather than shrinking assets and retiring deposits to 
reduce the leverage. In such way, they can maximize their asset volume and, thus, 
the value of the insurance subsidy.
Using the same two-period state-preference model, Gjerde and Semmen [21] 
extend Furlong and Keeley’s study [20] by examining both risk-based capital 
requirements and leverage restriction. They show that under the leverage restric-
tion, bank managers maximize both the leverage up to the regulator’s restriction 
and the asset risk to exploit the most benefit of the deposit insurance. However, 
the total value of the bank is a negative function of the risk-based equity ratio. The 
higher risk-based equity ratio reduces the possible investment in riskiest asset and, 
thus, lowers the value of deposit insurance. Therefore, with a constrained amount 
of equity, banks will minimize the leverage to be able to invest in high-risk assets. 
When the amount of equity is not constrained, bank managers will increase the 
equity until all funds are invested into the riskiest assets. The authors add that either 
minimum leverage ratio or risk-based capital ratio is efficient in regulating bank 
risk if the risk weights are optimal. However, if there is suboptimal risk weights 
(which is very likely in practice), a combination of both requirements is necessary 
to control bank portfolio risk.
2 This is because bank portfolio choice not only depends on the regulation but also other factors such as 
monopoly power, liquidity, scale or scope of economies, risk aversion, or special information availability.
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Nevertheless, the reducing-risk effect of capital requirements is not always 
supported. Gennotte and Pyle [23] depart significantly from previous research by 
relaxing the assumption about bank assets as zero net present-value projects and 
show that under certain circumstances, increased risk-based capital requirements 
lead to higher asset risk. Arguing that evaluating and monitoring loans are costly, 
the authors assume that bank assets are nonzero net present-value investments. 
The bank determines its optimal asset portfolio based on the tradeoff between the 
portfolio’s net present value and subsidy value. Bank’s response to the increase in 
capital requirements depends on the sign of the net present value of the asset port-
folio, which is a function of the asset risk and the level of investment. Although 
the market value of bank equity decreases with an increase in asset risk under 
tightened capital requirements, if the net present value of the asset portfolio is 
sufficiently negative and large, bank can offset this decrease by increasing the risk 
and reducing the level of investment simultaneously. Thus, bank asset portfolio 
comprises both relatively safe assets and risky assets with higher fraction of riskier 
assets.
Taking into consideration the limited liability of banks, Rochet [24] claims that 
the constraint in capital ratio can induce banks to choose very “extreme” asset port-
folios with specialization on some assets. This negative effect eventually dominates 
the risk aversion characteristic, and even correct risk weights cannot prevent banks 
from inefficiently asset allocations.
Arguing that static framework, as in aforementioned studies, might neglect the 
intertemporal consequences of risk-taking behaviors of banks and preclude cross-
sectional predictions of banks with different capital positions, Calem and Rob [25] 
develop a dynamic model which allows for the variation of bank’s capital position 
over time and across banks to predict bank risk-taking behavior under the capital 
regulation. In this model, banks are considered to operate in a multi-period setting 
and aim to maximize the discounted value of their profits. In each period, based 
on a specific capital position, the bank will determine its portfolio by choosing 
between its safe and risky assets. From this portfolio choice, the bank’s returns are 
realized. This realization of returns together with the preexisting capital position 
would then determine the next period’s capital position. The process is carried 
out in such a way that the bank faces the same portfolio choice with different 
capital positions in each period and equivalently for different banks with different 
capital positions. Calibrating the model using empirical data on the US banks in 
1984–1993, the authors show that under increasingly stringent capital require-
ments, the level of bank’s risk-taking depends on the bank’s current capital position 
with a roughly U-shaped relationship, and bank risk-taking is restrained only if the 
risk-based capital standard is stringent enough.
In terms of the dynamic of capital regulation, Blum [26] analyzes the effect of 
capital regulation on bank risk-taking in a multi-period framework. The author 
shows that if the bank faces capital requirement only in the first period, it would 
decrease the risk due to the increase in equity. However, tightening capital ratio in 
the second period generates two possible effects. First, it lowers the expected profit 
of the banks. Bank managers are induced to take more risk with the perception 
that they have less to lose in the case of bankruptcy. Second, the binding regulation 
increases the marginal return on risk and reinforces the first effect. Consequently, 
the overall risk of regulated banks goes up. Silva [27] completes Blum’s model by 
providing the computed values of the threshold requirements for which the risk 
chosen by the bank converges to the zero bankruptcy cost and social optimum. 
These values, in turn, depend critically on the initial equity of the bank. The 
author confirms that constant capital requirements could efficiently reduce bank’s 
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risk-taking and thus achieve the zero bankruptcy cost as well as socially efficient 
level of risk. However, this effect requires a very high level of capital requirement, 
which might not be practicable.
Recently, Zweifel et al. [22] consider bank’s objective as maximizing the risk-
adjusted return on capital (RAROC). The model assumes that bank’s optimal capital 
level is determined through a three-stage process. In the first stage, the bank faces 
exogenous shocks on expected return and volatility, which affects its solvency-level 
adjustment in the second stage in a way of maximizing the RAROC. In the third 
stage, the bank rebalances its assets in response to changes in the solvency level by 
choosing new values for expected returns and risk. An internal efficiency frontier 
is formed with its slope depending on the capital regulation such as Basel I and 
Basel II. Against the expectation that these regulations can reduce the slope of the 
efficient frontier (i.e., banks choose lower expected return and volatility), the study 
shows that both Basel I and Basel II may lead banks to choose higher-risk positions 
than it would otherwise. The risk is likely to increase even in the case of Basel III 
regulation.
4.2 Franchise value theory
The capital requirements are expected to reduce bank’s excessive risk-taking. 
However, analysis under the moral hazard theory does not always support this argu-
ment. A substantial part of researchers has relied on the franchise value to explain 
the effect of risk-based capital requirements on bank risk-taking. Franchise value is 
the accumulated present value of a bank’s expected future profits if it operates con-
tinuously and represents an opportunity cost if the bank goes bankrupt [28]. The 
higher the franchise value, the more the bank stands to lose by becoming insolvent. 
In contrast, with no franchise value, the bank has nothing to protect and no worry 
about bankruptcy. Two main sources of bank’s franchise value are market-related 
and bank-related factors [29]. Market-related factors such as competition environ-
ment, legislation restrictions, and technology innovation create the differences in 
franchise value in banks across geographic or product markets, while bank-related 
factors can originate from efficiency variations in bank operations, relationship 
management, or branch networks. Researchers under franchise value theory usually 
take into account the competition of the banking environment to explain the effect 
of capital requirements on bank risk.
With the notion that competition contributes to the erosion of bank’s franchise 
value and reduces its motivation to take less risk, Hellmann [30] investigates the 
effect of capital standards in the environment of competition. They argue that capi-
tal requirements reduce bank’s moral hazard by putting their equity at risk, which 
they regard as the capital-at-risk effect. However, they can have adverse effect by 
harming bank’s franchise value due to lower per-period future profits and thus 
induce them to take more risk. The latter consequence is known as franchise-value 
effect. Liberalization will intensify the competition among banks and encourage 
them to offer inefficient deposit rates to steal shares from their competitors. In such 
event, bank can only increase their franchise value by gambling. Therefore, capital 
requirements in a competitive deposit environment cannot make banks pursue 
a prudent investment strategy. The authors then suggest that a combination of 
deposit rate ceiling and capital requirement will help address the problem.
This effect is reexamined by Repullo [31] but in an explicit model of imperfect 
competition. The author discovers that the Hellmann’s conclusion [30] is only true 
in the case of a very competitive deposit market where intermediaries can earn low 
return margins. In markets where banks can earn an intermediate margins, they can 
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invest in both risky and safe assets. In the extreme case of monopolistic markets, 
only prudent investments exist. Moreover, if the cost of capital due to the increase 
in capital requirements exceeds the returns of the safe asset, capital requirements 
are always effective in preventing banks from taking excessive risks. This is because 
banks can fully transfer all the cost of higher capital requirements to the depositors. 
This makes the equilibrium expected margins unchanged and so does the franchise 
values. In such case, the increased capital reduces the equilibrium deposit rate in a 
way that the bank’s franchise value does not vary and, thus, reduce bank’s incentive 
to take very risky assets.
Following Repullo’s approach [31], Zhang et al. [32] show that bank franchise 
value decreases with an increase in the capital ratio. With the enforcement of capital 
requirements, the bank holds a capital ratio as near the minimum capital require-
ment as possible to maximize its franchise value. In maximizing the franchise value, 
bank invests less in risky assets with an increase in the capital ratio. Consequently, 
capital requirements are effective in changing bank risk preference and reducing 
bank’s incentive to take risk.
Behr [33] also examines how stricter capital requirement affects bank’s risk-tak-
ing in different market structures. The results bear a slight resemblance to Repullo 
[31] except for the case when the bank operates in a moderate competitive environ-
ment. The difference may be in the assumption of the objective functions of the 
bank. Behr [33] shows that in low concentrated markets, banks have low franchise 
values. The bank’s objective in such an environment is to maximize the short-term 
profits and, thus, have great incentives to take risks to increase the franchise values. 
Therefore, capital requirements will play the discipline role to reduce bank’s risk-
taking. On the other hand, in highly concentrated markets, the banks do not have to 
compete severely with each other, and their franchise values are higher. The bank’s 
objective now is not only to maximize the short-term profits but also the expected 
future profits, which are the franchise values. Bank, therefore, will be less induced 
to engage in high-risk assets as they would threaten its high franchise values. The 
role of capital regulation in this case becomes less clear.
4.3 Capital buffer theory
Extending from the franchise value literature, emerging studies have focused on 
the dynamic of bank’s franchise value, which forms a new theory of bank behavior 
under capital regulation—capital buffer theory. Accordingly, there are costs in 
changing the level of capital and falling below the required capital level. These costs 
can be implicit or explicit. Implicit costs can arise from the regulatory interven-
tion to limit the likelihood of a deposit insurance, whereas explicit costs refer to 
the regulators’ restrictions or penalties due to noncompliance with the minimum 
capital requirement or even liquidation [34]. In order to avoid these costs, banks 
have incentives to hold a buffer above the minimum capital requirement.
Taking into account this incentive effect of capital regulation, Milne and 
Whalley [35] show that bank’s attitude toward risk depends on its capital buffer 
and that in the long run, the capital regulation has no impact on bank risk behav-
ior. However, this is true only when deposit is not remunerated. When allowing 
for deposit repayment, an increase in capital requirements increases bank’s 
franchise value3 and affects the desired capital buffer. The risk-taking incentive 
3 This is because capital is viewed as an endogenous response to capital regulation. This means that an 
increase in capital constraint leads to bank recapitalization either through reducing dividend or issuing 
new equity. Although the shareholder value declines, the present value of all future expected payments to 
shareholders is higher. Therefore, higher capital requirements are associated with higher franchise value.
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is thus reduced. But if the bank has adequate earnings, capital requirements 
exert little impact on bank risk-taking. In the short run, the bank risk behavior is 
similar to the prediction of franchise value theory. Specifically, fully capitalized 
banks, which have successfully built up the desired level of capital, are insured 
against the cost of recapitalization and liquidation, so they aim to minimize 
the cash flow uncertainty and be risk-averse. However, if those banks suffer 
from severe deterioration of cash flow but not so much to destroy the value of 
shareholder, they will take greater risk to avoid costly equity issuance. Whereas, 
banks with less than minimum required capital (normally when regulatory audit 
is random) are under the threat of regulation intervention and thus, become risk 
lovers to maximize the cash-flow uncertainty.
Milne [36] examines this incentive effect of capital requirements on bank’s 
portfolio choice. The author shows that in the short run, banks struggling to meet 
the regulatory capital requirements will reduce the holding of highly risky assets, 
while well-capitalized banks face little pressure from regulatory in allocating their 
portfolio. An exceptional case is failing banks which consider the capital regulation 
breaches as unavoidable and choose their portfolio without regarding the effect of the 
regulation. However, to the extent that the value of bank assets can be realized (e.g., 
through loan trading or securitization), the risk-based capital requirements have no 
impact on bank’s portfolio choice. In the medium term, banks raise capital until the 
marginal expected cost of breaching the regulatory requirement equals the marginal 
financing cost of equity and debt. The effect of capital requirements on bank’s asset 
portfolio, thus, depends on the marginal costs of debt and equity finance.
4.4 Agency problem theory
While higher capital level can help reduce the conflicts between the bank’s 
shareholders and debt holders, in this case the depositors, it may reinforce the 
conflicts between the shareholders and the managers [37]. In banking, the share-
holders normally delegate the operations of the bank to the managers. Both parties 
aim to maximize their benefits, and it would be difficult for the shareholders to 
ensure that the managers are acting in the best interests of the shareholders. The 
agency problem refers to the divergence in the interest of managers and sharehold-
ers when managers indulged to maximize their own utility rather than the bank 
value [38].
Besanko and Kanatas [39] argue that the underpriced deposit insurance adds 
to the bank’s surplus from lending. This motivates bank’s managers to manage 
the loans efficiently in order to realize the surplus (i.e., when loans are repaid). 
However, increasing capital requirements lead to higher cost of fund which reduces 
the managers’ surplus. Together with the issuance of new equity to satisfy the 
higher capital standards, the insiders’ ownership is diluted sufficiently to reduce 
their incentives to make effort in monitoring the loans. This negative effect of 
enforced capital requirements can be greater than the benefit of asset substitution 
by requiring the shareholders to have more capital. The net effect is a rise in the 
overall riskiness of bank assets.
Taking the effect of general equilibrium into concern, Gale [40] also suggests 
that increasing capital requirements may have adverse effect on bank risk-taking. 
Given the nature that the manager’s private benefit can be damaged if the bank 
goes bankruptcy, the managers have incentives to be risk-averse. They will aim to 
maximize the probability of the success state of the investment subject to the bank’s 
capital constraints. Hence, they will choose the asset with the lowest return but 
larger than the case without capital constraint. Given the high-risk, high return 
assumption, the bank risk will increase.
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Incorporating the difference in manager’s incentives with those of the share-
holders and deposit insurers in a model with four distinct characteristics on the 
risk-return asset profiles, Jeitschko and Jeung [41] show that under capital regula-
tion, the bank risk varies with the relative forces of these agents. If the shareholder’s 
objective dominates, the bank risk might decrease with higher capital requirement. 
In contrast, a manager-driven bank is inclined to undertake more risk under 
tightened capital requirements because in such case, the manager’s private benefit is 
larger with the increase in asset risk.
5. Global evidences
Reviews of theoretical models that explain the effect of capital requirements on 
bank risk behaviors show that the prediction of these models highly depends on model 
assumptions. This makes the results vary when certain assumptions are relaxed. Thus, 
a substantial effort has relied on empirical evidences to investigate the effect of the 
risk-based capital regulation on bank risk-taking. Most researches are carried out in 
the USA and the European countries, which are members of the Basel Committee. The 
results, however, differ across countries and time period (see Table 2).
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6. Conclusion
Efficient risk management is crucial for banks to ensure their profitability and 
maximize the shareholder’s value. Over the past decades, the risk management 
practice has changed dramatically under the forces of the business environment and 
technology development. An important factor contributes to the way banks manage 
their risk is the regulation. This chapter shows how the regulators regulate bank risk 
with an emphasis on the risk-based capital regulation. It also reviews theoretical 
studies on how the risk-based capital regulation affects bank risk-taking. These 
studies explain the effect of capital regulation on bank risk considering different 
factors such as moral hazard, franchise value, capital buffer, and agency problem. 
The prediction of these studies is restricted by and depends on model assump-
tions. The chapter also provides empirical evidences from countries worldwide and 




Authors Risk proxy Capital 
regulation 
proxy
Effect of capital 
regulation on risk




















































Notes: + Gap approach measures capital regulation as the distance of bank capital ratio from certain threshold, 
usually the minimum capital requirement.
+ Dummy approach assigns value 1 for banks whose capital ratios are less than certain threshold and 0 otherwise.
+ Probabilistic approach assigns value 1 for banks which are probably to be under regulatory pressure and 0 otherwise.
Table 2. 
Global evidences about the effect of capital regulation on bank risk.
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